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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICKY PALMER,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
Case No.
Priority No. 2

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

Case No. 890583-CA
Priority No. 2

RICKY PALMER,
Defendant/Appellant.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Was the evidence regarding the inevitability of discovery
of the ring susceptible to only a determination that the inevitable
discovery doctrine did not apply, thereby making the decision of the
Court of Appeals to remand this case for further proceedings in
conflict with existing law and the usual course of judicial
proceedings?

OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on November 14,
1990; the opinion appears at State v. Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 42
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

A copy of the opinion is contained in

Addendum A.

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this Petition
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990).

The Court

of Appeals denied Appellant's Petition for Rehearing on January 29,
1991 (see Addendum B). This Petition is therefore timely filed.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, applies
to this case.

Other relevant constitutional provisions, statutes,

and rules are contained in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The trial court denied Petitioner's Motion to Suppress
after an evidentiary hearing held on August 23, 1989.
T. 81.

R. 27;

Immediately thereafter, Appellant entered a conditional plea

of guilty pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), explicitly preserving his right to appeal the trial
court's denial of his motion to suppress.
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R. 37; T. 81-2.
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(T. 60), testified that after he went to Sears and assessed the
situation, he did the following:
I contacted the Salt Lake County Jail and
advised them we had a suspect that we believed
had swallowed the ring and if there were
facilities available to keep him under
surveillance and if the ring were passed, we
could recover it. They advised me it was
not—they did not have the capability.

Sgt. Mayo also testified as follows:
MR. BRADSHAW (Defense Counsel): You said the
jail indicated to you—Who did you speak to in
the jail, first of all, if you recall?
SGT. MAYO: I asked for a jail supervisor and
the gentleman came out and identified himself,
but I don't recall who it was.
Q: They told you they did not have a facility
in which Mr. Palmer could be kept?
A. No, what they advised me he didn't have the
capability to watch him until he passed the
ring and retained that and searched through it.
Q: So, in terms, did you ask if they had a
room which he would be kept in isolation?
A: Yes. I explained the situation to him. We
had a subject who we believed had swallowed the
ring and did they have the capability of
keeping him under surveillance until he passed
the ring, and then recovering that so that we
could go through it and recover the ring.
Q: They indicated they didn't have someone who
could watch him?
A: They didn't say they didn't have the
capability.
Q: Ultimately, he was placed in isolation at
the Salt Lake County Jail?
A:

I don't know.
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Q:

Do you know if the ring was recovered?

A:

I don't.

Q: Did you ask them if they had a room in
which he could be kept absent someone to watch
him 24 hours a day?
A: No, I didn't. I explained our problem and
asked them if they could help us. No. 1, I
wanted him kept under surveillance. And No. 2,
he had some sort of capability of recovering
the feces to that we could go through it. And
they advised they didn't have that capability.
Q: I guess, maybe we are not communicating,
but you wanted someone to watch him 24 hours a
day. What is the problem in your estimation
with just putting him in a room where he can't
dispose of the feces, where he is in complete
lockdown in isolation and keeping him there?
A:

Well-

Q:

Why doesn't that serve your purpose?

A: Obviously, we have to have him pass the
feces.
Q:

I understand that.

A: What we have is the capability of
recovering the feces so that it is not flushed
away.
Q: The feces can't go out of the room. Feces
can't go out of the room. He is kept in the
room. Why do you have to have someone watch
him 24 hours a day?
A: Well, let's assume he just passed the feces
and he goes through it himself and he recovers
the ring, and then secretes it into his body
again somehow.
Q:

Okay, assume that.

A:

All right.

Q:

You have still got him in the room, right?

- 5
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A:

Yes.

Q: The ring and Mr. Palmer are still in the
room?
A: How long can we keep him in a situation as
you described, where you keep passing the ring
and recovering the ring and secreting it again,
until we reach a situation where we have, in
fact, violated some sort of rights by being
able to recover the ring ourselves.
Q:

Did you consider the option?

A: Basically, I presented the jail with my
problem and asked them if they could provide
the capability of recovering the ring for us,
if it was passed through his feces. They told
me they did do that.
Q: Mv question is, did you consider the
option? The one I purposed(sic) where he is
kept in isolation without someone watching him?
A:

Well, no, not specifically because—

Q: Did you purpose(sic) that option to the
iail?
A: No. As I said, I advised them of our
problem and they best knowing their
capabilities and so forth, they advised me that
they could not do that.
Q: Did you in the course of your investigation
and your decision as to how to proceed, seek
and find information in regards to how long the
ring would be inside of an individual if they
had, in fact, swallowed it?
A:

T. 32-35.

No.

Following defense counsel's line of questioning, the

State did not ask any questions of Sgt. Mayo on redirect
examination.

The parties also presented a stipulation that after
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the x-ray located the ring inside Mr. Palmer, officers placed him in
isolation, but not under observation.

T. 62.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Remand for a factual determination is inappropriate where
the evidence is susceptible to a single factual determination.

The

evidence in the present case is susceptible to a single factual
determination.

First, the evidence unequivocally demonstrates that

an independent investigation was not in place when the
unconstitutional x-ray was taken.

Second, even if the "routine

booking procedure" alternative is applicable in the instant case,
the State presented no evidence regarding routine booking procedures
at the Salt Lake County Jail.

The evidence which was presented is

susceptible only to a finding that isolating the keeping a defendant
in constant surveillance is not part of the routine booking
procedure.
Because a finding either that an independent
investigation was in place or that routine booking procedures would
have led to the discovery of the ring would be clearly erroneous
given the evidence introduced at the hearing and the State's failure
to sustain its burden, remand is an unnecessary and time-consuming
procedure.

ARGUMENT
POINT. REMAND IS INAPPROPRIATE SINCE THE RECORD
REGARDING THE INEVITABILITY OF DISCOVERY IS
CAPABLE OF ONLY ONE FACTUAL DETERMINATION.

In discussing the inevitable discovery doctrine as it
applies to the instant case, the Court of Appeals stated:
This court cannot properly determine the
outcome of a fact sensitive issue where the
record below is not clear or uncontroverted, or
capable of only one finding. (citation
omitted).
Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45.
Contrary to the implication of this statement, the record
in the present case is capable of only one factual finding and legal
conclusion—that the State failed to establish that the ring would
inevitably have been discovered.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged in its opinion that the
State has the burden of establishing that the warrantless search in
this case was lawful.

State v. Palmer. 147 Utah Adv Rep. at 43.

That burden applies to the inevitability of the discovery as well as
the existence of exigent circumstances.

See United States v.

Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989).
The remand in this case is apparently for a factual
finding only, and not for a new evidentiary hearing since the State
has already had the opportunity to introduce evidence to sustain its
burden.

In deciding whether the State sustained its burden, the

focus should therefore be entirely on the evidence presented at the
August 23, 1989 hearing.1

1

It should be noted that the trial judge in this case
has recently been elevated to the Court of Appeals.

- a

In his reply brief in the Court of Appeals, Mr. Palmer
discussed the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to
the facts in the present case at length.

He pointed out that Nix v.

Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 456-7, 459 (1984), the lead case in the
area, requires that an independent line of investigation be in place
at the time the constitutional violation occurred for the doctrine
to apply.

See Appellant's Reply Brief at 10-11, 14-15.

See also

United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984)
("if evidence is obtained by illegal conduct, the illegality can be
cured only if the police possessed and were pursuing lawful means of
discovery at the time the illegality occurred."

(emphasis added)).

A few courts have extended the inevitable discovery
doctrine to include situations where routine booking procedures
would have led to the discovery of the evidence.

See United

States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1988)(discovery not
inevitable since "the record reveals no evidence that [inventory]
searches were an invariable, routine procedure in the booking and
detention of a suspect . . . " ) ; United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d
1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986)("routine booking procedure and inventory
would inevitably have resulted in discovery of cocaine"); United
States v. Ramirez-Sandoval. 872 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The
government can meet its burden by establishing that, by following
routine procedures, the police would have inevitably uncovered
evidence.").
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Courts have clarified that the fact that officers could
have pursued an independent investigation is not enough; the
government must establish that it would have done so.

See

Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d at 1400; see also 4 La Fave, Search and
Seizure, § 11.4(a) at 384.
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in the
instant case is capable of only one factual finding regarding an
independent investigation.

Sgt. Mayo, the officer in charge,

clearly stated as set forth in the Statement of Facts in this brief,
that he chose to have Mr. Palmer x-rayed rather than pursue the
independent approach of isolating him.

T. 35.

If the trial judge

were to find on remand that Sgt. Mayo was pursuing an independent
investigation at the time the illegal x-ray was taken, such a
finding would be clearly erroneous given the testimony set forth
above.
Neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has addressed
whether the "routine booking procedure" alternative is applicable in
this jurisdiction.

The applicability of such an alternative is a

legal question; if it is not applicable, the trial court's factual
finding as to whether routine booking procedures would have
unearthed the ring is irrelevant.
However, even if the "routine booking procedure"
alternative is applicable, the State failed to establish during the
evidentiary hearing that routine booking procedures would have
unearthed the ring.

The State presented absolutely no evidence as

to what comprises routine booking procedures in the Salt Lake County

- 1 0 -

Jail.

Although Sgt. Mayo testified regarding his attempts to

ascertain whether the jail had the capability to isolate and monitor
Mr. Palmer (T. 32-5), his testimony did not relate to routine
booking procedures.

It related, instead, to a special request by an

officer overseeing investigation.

This testimony, therefore,

related to the issue of whether an independent investigation was
being pursued at the time of the constitutional violation and not to
whether routine booking procedures would have led to the discovery
of the ring.
In addition, the stipulation introduced by counsel did
not address routine booking procedures.

Instead, it covered the

actions taken at the jail after the ring was discovered pursuant to
the unlawful x-ray.

T. 62. Where the subsequent recovery of the

evidence is triggered by or the fruit of the illegal search, the
inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply.

See People v. Knapp,

422 N.E.2d 531, 536 (N.Y. App. 1981); see also Ramirez-Sandoval, 872
F.2d at 1396, quoting United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862,
864-5 (9th Cir. 1987)("This doctrine requires that 'the fact or
likelihood that makes the discovery inevitable arise from
circumstances other than those disclosed by the illegal search
itself.'").
Furthermore, the evidence introduced during the
evidentiary hearing established that the jail did not have the
"capability" to isolate and monitor Mr. Palmer.

T. 32-5.

If the

jail did not have the capability to isolate and monitor a defendant
when a special request is made by an investigating officer, it

- 11 -

certainly does not isolate and monitor defendants as a routine part
of the booking procedure.
Given the fact that the State did not introduce any
evidence regarding routine booking procedures and the evidence is
uncontroverted that the jail did not have the capability to isolate
and monitor a defendant, there is simply no evidence in the record
which demonstrates that routine booking procedures would have led to
the discovery of the ring; the State, therefore, did not sustain its
burden of establishing that the ring would have been found as part
of routine booking procedures.
If the trial court were to make a factual finding on
remand that the State sustained its burden of establishing that the
ring would have been located as part of routine booking procedures,
such a finding would be clearly erroneous.
Because the State failed to present any evidence during
the evidentiary hearing that an independent investigation was in
place or that routine booking procedures would have led to the
discovery of the ring, the inevitable discovery doctrine is not
applicable to this case.

Remanding this case for a factual

determination serves no purpose and delays the ultimate disposition
of this in-custody defendant's case.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Palmer respectfully requests that this Court grant a
writ of certiorari in his case to review the Court of Appeals7
resolution of the State's inevitable discovery argument.

-
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CODE»CO
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inspect and value the property. Koplin testified
at trial that his appraisal of the property as
having a fair market value of $31,800 was as
of the date of the trustee's sale. His valuation
opinion was rejected by the trial court primarily because he admitted not knowing the
condition of the property at the time of the
sale and not entering the attic of the home,
where severe structural problems were evident.
Furthermore, Johnson could have attended the
trustee's sale and made a fixed-dollar bid to
protect his own interests, but he chose not to
because he believed that the fair market value
of the property was greater that his indebtedness. Because no other bidders attended the
sale, Thomas's bid did not scare off other
potential purchasers of the property to
Johnson's prejudice. Any injury to Johnson's
interests resulted from his own inaction and
imprudent judgment, not from any noncompliance with the statutes governing nonjudicial
foreclosure sales. We therefore conclude that
the trial court properly declined to set aside
the trustee's sale in this case.
In light of Johnson's failure to demonstrate
any clear error, see Utah R. Civ. P. 52, we
also reject Johnson's challenge to the trial
court's finding that the fair market value of
the property on the date of the trustee's sale
was $21,750. The other issues raised by
Johnson are completely meritless and we deem
it unnecessary to address them further. See State
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah
1989).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed,
and the case is remanded for the trial court's
determination and award of reasonable attorney fees, authorized by section 57-1-32,
that appellees have incurred on appeal.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Johnson also argues briefly that the sale is invalid
because the trustee did not require the bid to be
"payable in lawful money of the United States at the
time of sale/ as allegedly instructed in the trust
deed. The trust deed, however, was not offered or
admitted into evidence at trial. In any event, we
believe that a credit bid by the beneficiary of a trust
deed is a bid "payable in lawful money of the
United States," even though the trustee does not go
through the meaningless motions of taking, with one
hand, actual money from a person as the highest
bidder at the trust sale and then returning the
money with the other hand to the same person as
the trust deed beneficiary.

Provo, Utah
Cite as

147 Utah Adv. Rep. 42

IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Ricky PALMER,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890583-CA
FILED: November 14, 1990
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Leonard H. Russon
ATTORNEYS:
James C. Bradshaw and Joan C. Watt, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, David B. Thompson, and
Judith Atherton, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Defendant Ricky Palmer appeals from a
judgment and conviction for retail theft, a
third degree felony. Defendant filed a motion
to suppress certain evidence obtained from a
warrantless X-ray search of his body. After
the motion was denied, defendant entered a
conditional plea of guilty pursuant to State v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Cu App. 1988).
Under Sery, defendant explicitly preserved his
right to appeal the denial of the motion to
suppress. On appeal, he argues that the warrantless X-ray search violated his rights
against unreasonable search and seizure. We
reverse and remand.
On May 3, 1989, at about 6:00 p.m., a
Sears security guard was called to the store's
diamond counter where a salesclerk informed
her that a customer had just taken a diamond
ring, leaving a paste ring in its place. When
the salesclerk called security, the customer had
left the diamond counter and was exiting the
store. The security guard examined the paste
ring and then proceeded after the customer,
defendant Ricky Palmer.
The security guard followed defendant out
to the store parking lot and waited until a
second security guard arrived. The security
guard then asked defendant to return to the
store with them. Inside the store, defendant
was informed that the security guards believed
he had switched a paste ring for a real
diamond ring belonging to Sears. Defendant
denied that he had possession of a ring. A patdown search was conducted with defendant's
consent, but the ring was not found. The Salt
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Lake City Police Department was called, and
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Officer David Hendrix responded to the sus- |
The
standard
of review for a challenge to a
pected shoplifting.
Officer Hendrix was joined at Sears by two lower court's suppression ruling was stated by
other police officers. Because they were unsure this court in State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326
how to proceed, Officer Hendrix called his (Utah Ct. App. 1989): "In considering the trial
supervisor, Sergeant Foster Mayo. When court's action in denying defendant's motion
Sergeant Mayo arrived at Sears, a thorough to suppress, we will not disturb its factual
search was conducted of the store parking lot evaluation unless its findings are clearly errowhere defendant had been first detained, and neous." Id. at 327. See also State v. Marshall,
the surrounding area. Defendant then submi- 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
tted to a strip search but the ring was still not "However, in assessing the trial court's legal
located. At this point, the police suspected conclusions based upon its factual findings, we
that defendant had swallowed the ring. Serg- afford it no deference but apply a 'correction
eant Mayo telephoned the Salt Lake County of error standard'." Johnson, 111 P.2d at
Attorney's Office and the Salt Lake County 327.
Jail for advice, and decided to proceed with
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
an X-ray search. If the X-ray showed def"Warrantless searches and seizures are per
endant was not in possession of the ring, se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances
Sergeant Mayo intended to send more officers require that the search be performed before a
to conduct another search of the Sears parking warrant can be obtained." State v. Christensen,
lot. Having already been placed under arrest, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984); Katz v.
defendant was transported in handcuffs to United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Since the
Holy Cross Hospital at approximately 6:30 j police had no warrant to search defendant in
p.m.
' the present case, the State had the burden of
After arriving at Holy Cross Hospital, def- showing that the search was lawful. See State
endant objected to being subjected to an X- v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990).
ray search. Three police officers who had
Both defendant and the State agree that in
accompanied defendant to the X-ray depar- order to determine if a bodily search violates
tment told defendant that he did not have a the fourth amendment, the applicable test is
choice regarding the X-ray, at which point that articulated by the United States Supreme
defendant became combative. The police off- Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
icers forcibly restrained defendant and the X- ' 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court set out
rayrwas taken. There was a shape resembling a j three requirements that must be met: (1) there
ring evident in the X-ray of defendant's are exigent circumstances that justify the
stomach. The police then took defendant to warrantless bodily intrusion; (2) there is a
the Salt Lake County Jail where arrangements clear indication that such evidence will be
were made to place him in an isolation cell. found; and (3) the method chosen is a reasoThe ring eventually passed through his system nable one, performed in a reasonable manner.
and was retrieved by jail personnel.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-72. We address
Defendant moved to suppress the X-ray only the first requirement in this case, because
and all evidence obtained after the X-ray was we conclude that exigent circumstances were
taken. Defendant argued that the warrantless not present.
bodily intrusion violated his fourth amendIn denying defendant's motion to suppress,
ment rights and that all evidence derived from the court stated:
. , * * * .
the search should be suppressed. The State
[T]he evidence shows that there was
contended that the search was reasonable. The
such a high probability that
trial court denied defendant's motion to sup[Palmer] had swallowed the ring
press, finding that the presence of exigent
because [the officers] had made a
circumstances justified the warrantless search
thorough search of everywhere. No
of defendant's body.
avenues seemed left where it could
On appeal, defendant reiterates his claim
be. However, since that is a possithat the X-ray and all evidence thereafter
bility that could exist, and because
obtained should have been suppressed. Speciit was such a public place and
fically, defendant argues that there were not
because dark was approaching, that
exigent circumstances present to dispense with
the circumstances were of such a
the warrant requirement; nothing clearly ind- I
nature as to require an immediate
icated that the ring would be found inside of
final determination in this regard
defendant; the X-ray was not a reasonable I
and
they were therefore justified in
method for locating the ring; and the X-ray
making this determination and not
was not conducted in a reasonable manner, j
waiting for a search warrant.
The State argues that the X-ray search was
The trial court explicitly relied on People v.
reasonable, but that even if the search violated j
defendant's rights, the ring was still admiss- j Williams, 157 111. App. 3d 996, 510 N.E.2d
ible under the "inevitable discovery" rule.
I 445 (1987). On similar facts, the Illinois Court
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of Appeals held exigent circumstances were
present since "[T]he deputies needed to know
whether defendant had ingested the ring or
whether they needed to begin a detailed search
of every place defendant had been since his
arrest." Id. at 448. We decline to follow the
rationale of Williams, as it is contrary to established Utah law.
In Utah, in order to establish exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless
search the State must show either that the
procurement of a warrant would have jeopardized the safety of the police officers or the
public, or that the evidence was likely to have
been lost or destroyed. Larocco, 794 P.2d at
470. "Once the threat that the suspect will
injure the officers or will destroy the evidence
is gone, there is no persuasive reason why the
officers cannot take the time to secure a
warrant/ Id. See also Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (warrantless
searches only permitted to protect safety of
police or public or to prevent destruction of
evidence); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1259
(Utah 1987) (where there was an interested
party in the suspects house who was aware
police were approaching, exigent circumstances
existed to allow warrantless entry of residence
to prevent possible destruction of contraband);
Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411 (for the warrantless search of automobiles exception to
apply, the police must have probable cause to
believe that the evidence will be lost if not
immediately seized).
In Larocco, the Utah Supreme Court simplified the search and seizure rules so that they
could "be more easily followed by the police
and the courts and, at the same time, provide
the public with consistent and predictable
protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures." Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469. The court
held:
This can be accomplished by eliminating some of the confusing exceptions to the warrant requirement
.... [W]arrantless searches will be
permitted only where they satisfy
their traditional justification,
namely [1] to protect the safety of
police or the public or [2] to
prevent the destruction of evidence.
Id. at 469-470 (citations omitted).
Describing when the second exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement
applies, the Larocco court said, "the police
must have probable cause and believe that
either contraband or evidence of a crime ...
may be lost if not immediately seized." Id. at
470 (quoting State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d at
411). This definition of exigent circumstances
parallels that stated in United States Supreme
Court case law: that an arresting officer may
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person and in the area "within his
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immediate control," in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. Chimel, 395 U.S.
at 762-763. See also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
769 (a lawful arrest may provide the arresting
officer with the right to search for concealed
weapons or evidence under the direct control
of the accused).
The possibility that the ring may have been
discovered by some passerby or third person is
not an exigent circumstance. See Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 770 ("In the absence of a clear
indication that in fact such evidence will be
found, these fundamental human interests
require law officers to suffer the risk that such
evidence may disappear unless there is an
immediate search."); U.S. v. Gorski, 852 F.2d
692, 695 (2nd Cir. 1988) (warrantless search
not justified by exigent circumstances where
the evidence was inaccessible to suspects and
there was no danger that it could be removed
before a warrant was obtained). In his treatise
on search and seizure, Professor LaFave cautioned against such a broad formulation of
exigent circumstances: "there is almost always
a partisan who might destroy or conceal evidence." 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§6.5(b) at 656 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1990)
(quoting United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 978,
979 (5th Cir. 1970)).
There was also no justifiable reason to
believe the ring would be destroyed by defendant if he had swallowed it, as the State would
have us believe. People v. Bracamonte, 15
Cal.3rd 394, 540 P.2d 624, 631, 124 Cal. Rptr.
528 (1975) (defendant seen to have swallowed
two balloons which police suspected contained
heroin; no justifiable reason to conduct warrantless search since evidence could be retrieved through "the ordinary processes of
nature"). Compare Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
770-71 (it is impractical to obtain a search
warrant due to the rapid dissipation of alcohol
in defendant's bloodstream).
The State could have easily obtained a
warrant for this search. See United States v.
Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
Recognizing the delay that is often incurred in
procuring a warrant, Utah has allowed for
issuance of a search warrant based on a sworn
telephonic statement of the officer seeking the
warrant. Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4(2)
(1990). In light of the comparative ease with
which a warrant can be obtained under Utah's
telephonic warrant statute, little or no impediment is presented to police investigations.
Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 (quoting State v.
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring)).
Applying the Larocco analysis of exigent
circumstances to the present case, we do not
believe the circumstances were such as would
justify a warrantless search.
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INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
On appeal, the State argued that even if the
warrantless X-ray of defendant were determined by this court to be unlawful, the ring
which was subsequently seized by the police
after it passed through defendant's system,
was admissible under the "inevitable discovery" rule. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431 (1984). This court recognized inevitable discovery as an exception to the exclusionary rule in State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d
1288, 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The State raised the theory of inevitable
discovery below; however, since the trial court
found that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless X-ray of defendant, the trial
court did not have to decide the question of
whether or not the ring inevitably would have
been discovered. This court cannot properly
determine the outcome of a fact-sensitive
issue where the record below is not clear and
uncontroverted, or capable of only one
finding. Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987). Issues that are presented in
search and seizure cases are highly fact sensitive. State v. Lovegren, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,
10 (Ct. App. 1990).
Because we find that there were no exigent
circumstances, the motion to suppress the X-ray was erroneously denied. As to the ring, we
remand for the factual determination of
whether the ring would have been inevitably
discovered and for such other proceedings as
may be appropriate.
.Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
The State appeals from a November 1,
1989, order of "dismissal with prejudice"
entered at the close of appellee Todd
Willard's bench trial for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute.
Because we conclude that the trial court's
action constituted an acquittal, which is not
appealable by the State, we dismiss the appeal.
Deputies from the Sevier County Sheriffs
Office set up a roadblock on March 10, 1988,
to check drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations. They stopped Willard, who provided
them with a valid license and registration, and
they eventually searched his vehicle and discovered a controlled substance. Willard was
charged with two counts of violating Utah
Code Ann. §58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) (Supp. 1989).
In accordance with Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2),
Willard filed a pretrial motion to suppress the
seized contraband, which was denied by the
trial court in January 1989. The case then
proceeded to a bench trial in May 1989.
After all the evidence was in and both sides
presented closing arguments, Willard renewed
his motion to suppress.1 The court granted the
motion, ruling that (1) the continued detention
of Willard, after the purpose for the roadblock had been accomplished, was unreasonable
and unconstitutional; and (2) Willard's
consent in fact to the search of the vehicle was
therefore irrelevant to the suppression issue.
Counsel for the State prepared an order granting the motion to suppress, which was
signed on September 19, 1989. Twenty-three
days later, the State filed a "Motion for Clarification" of the September order, ostensibly
to determine if the court had intended it as an
interlocutory order or as a "final order of
dismissal," which the prosecutor claimed
would be directly appeaiatble under Utah R.
Crim. P. 26(3)(a) and Utah Code Ann. §7735-26(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) (repealed by Utah
Laws 1989, ch. 187, §15, effective July 1,
1990; now see Utah Code Ann. §77-18a1(2) (Supp. 1990)). In response to the clarification request, the court entered an order on
November 1, 1989, dismissing the case with
prejudice. The State then filed this direct
appeal.
In its appeal, the State does not claim error
in the dismissal itself. Instead, it seeks review
of the September 1989 suppression order,
asserting that the fourth amendment analysis
underlying the court's grant of the motion to
suppress at trial is erroneous. Relying on Stare
v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), and State
v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct.
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ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 890583-CA

v.
Ricky Palmer,
Defendant and Appellant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's
Petition for Rehearing, filed December 19, 1990,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
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